ABSTRACT Nicholas Stern's Review of "The Economics of Climate Change" (2007) triggered considerable discussion, essentially by condensing a complex problem -the question of how to act in the face of global warming -into juxtaposing two numbers, the cost of mitigation and the cost of climate change. The Review concludes that mitigation today is economically superior to adaptation tomorrow. The review was widely criticized for the assumption of a pure rate of time preference of almost zero, on which its conclusions seemed to depend. In this paper we argue first, that this assumption discriminates against current in favour of future generations. Second, we perform a sensitivity analysis to test for the extent to which the conclusions of the Review are indeed based on the assumption of a rate of time preference of almost zero. We demonstrate that the conclusions of the Review are no longer valid as soon as parameter values are used which are standard in economic analysis. Combined, these results raise a bigger question: how wise is it to base crucial policy choices on a model so dependent on a single, deeply subjective, judgement call?
INTRODUCTION
The "Stern Review" on the economics of climate change (Stern 2007) derives its conclusions from combining inferences about the consequences of man made climate change with the tools of economic analysis. Its conclusions have commanded global attention. The most important of these conclusions is that the costs of mitigation, if mitigation is started early enough, will be lower than the costs of climate change, if nothing is done. Waiting therefore is not an option. Urgent action is imperative -and sufficient to avert the costly consequences of man made climate change.
The Review expresses the welfare loss of climate change in terms of lost consumption per capita. It estimates these costs at 5% and up to 20% of global consumption in perpetuity. 3 Mitigation costs are expressed as a fraction of global output. To reach the desired level of 550ppm CO2e, which the Review regards as suitable and attainable, green house gas emissions will need to be cut, which is costly. Mitigation cost will rise as a share of GDP and by 2050 will have reached approximately 1% of GDP. The Review is not clear about how much mitigation costs will rise after that point. With the costs of climate change at 5% of consumption, and consumption assumed at 80% of GDP, however, the costs of climate change are 4% of GDP, compared to mitigation costs of 1% of GDP. From these headline numbers, the Review concludes the obvious: Mitigation is preferred because it is cost effective.
A number of criticisms have been levelled against the Review, most of them concerned with a lack of rigour in analysis and data treatment. They include the following (the comments most relevant to the topic of the present paper are taken up in greater detail in the appendix).
• The Review uses two different consumption growth rates, and hence discount rates, to calculate the costs of mitigation and the costs of climate change (see appendix D).
• The Review compares different units of measurement for mitigation costs (expressed as a fraction of global output) and the costs of climate change (expressed as a fraction of consumption) (see appendix D).
• The time horizon in the report extents to 2050 for the discussion of mitigation costs, and is infinite in the case of climate change (though climate change is costly only up to the year 2200). 4 • The Review assumes that population grows at an annual rate of 0.6% until the year 2200 and then stops growing. No reason is given for this assumption which, however, ensures the analytical tractability of the Review (see appendix B).
• Some of the cost estimates for climate change are inconsistent with each other (cf. Stern 2007 p. 186 and p. 333) . However, the point that has attracted most attention among economists is the assumption of a rate of time preference of almost zero which underpins the conclusions of the Review. 5 It has been noted that a higher rate of time preference would presumably lead to different conclusions -in particular, to lower estimates of the cost of climate change (see e.g. Byatt et al (2006) , Mityakov and Rühl (2007) , Nordhaus (2007) ).
This relates to an important ethical judgement. A rate of pure time preference of zero means that the utility of future generation has the same weight as the utility of present generations: In general terms, today' consumption is of equal utility than tomorrow's consumption; this applies to individuals and generations alike. Most professional economists would say that future utility ought to be weighted lower than present utility -within the life of one person, and also when comparing across generations. It is, of course, possible, to argue that from an ethical point of view the utility of any future generation (including those not yet born) ought to be as valuable to present generations as the utility of those living today -which, at least within the rigorous standard framework of economic analysis, is the same as to say that future consumption within one's lifespan should be as valuable as consumption today.
There is no ethically "appropriate" value of the rate of time preference, despite a range of observable parameters. Just how much the assigned value lies in the eyes of the beholder is exemplified in the discussion spurred by Stern (2007, Chapter 2) (see Byatt et al (2006) , Nordhaus (2007 ), Weitzman (2007 ).
Even in the "dismal" science, surely two requirements must be met before making a parameter value which is a judgement call the central piece of an analysis with policy conclusions. The first is logical consistency; the second is clarity on the consequences for analysis and policy descriptions. On the first, we would argue that Stern's model requires that people who discount their own future utility or well-being need to discount the utility or well-being of others who are born in the future to the same degree. Otherwise, the model will imply discrimination by the date of birth, precisely what Stern later argued against, when trying to defend his assumption (cf. Stern 2009).
On the second, despite the widespread recognition of an ethical dimension to the Review's results, comparatively less effort has been made to assess and to quantify the actual impact of alternative parameter values for the rate of time preference. We try to fill this gap below, and to facilitate further discussion, by carrying out a sensitivity analysis for the rate of time preference using a standard macroeconomic model.
The results confirm just how very dependent the conclusions of the Review are on the assumed parameter value. For example, we show that calibrating the model at values of 3-4% for the rate of time preference, which are common in applied economics (e.g. Lucas (1988; 1990) , will decrease the estimated costs of climate change by at least a factor of 8 -but a cost differential by a factor of 4 is already sufficient to reverse the central policy conclusion of the Review.
The strength of the Stern Review lies in its ability to condense a complex problem -the question how to act in the face of global warming -into juxtaposing two numbers, the cost of mitigation and the costs of climate change. That strength has helped to generate a global discussion. But the way these two parameters are derived hides a poison pill for its lasting impact: The simulations below show the extent to which one of the core variables -the cost of climate change -, and with it all the policy conclusions of the Review, depend on a single, entirely subjective judgement call. 6 This should and it will substantiate scepticism about the alleged economic superiority of mitigation over adaptation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the ethical debate; section III provides the theoretical framework for the simulations; in Section IV we show the results of our numerical simulations. Section V concludes.
THE RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE AND INTERTEMPORAL CONSISTENCY
In a newly published book, Stern (2009 p. 83) defends assuming a rate of pure time preferences of 0.1%, the value, which was used in the Review and which was the subject of so much critique. He writes: "…if a pure-time discount rate of 2% is selected, then a life that starts in 2010 would be assigned approximately twice the social value of a life that starts in 2045. If we were to have applied these values consistently over time, a life that started in 1970 would have been, and would continue to be, assigned twice the value of one starting in 2005. In other words, someone born later counts for less. In effect, this is discrimination by date of birth."
Is it really that simple, or is there a logical flaw? On empirical grounds, we do seem to value utility in the future less than current utility. Observed real interest rate values are an indication of the fact that people are impatient to consume in their own livesnot only because they expect to be wealthier over time, but also because they prefer one unit of utility today to one unit of utility tomorrow. In fact, people "discriminate" against themselves tomorrow, in favour of themselves today.
But how do we treat somebody born 20 years from now? One can ask this question in a descriptive sense, by asking how people actually treat future generations, to the extent that such behaviour is observable in real life. Or one can ask it in a normative sense -how should future generations be treated? The second approach will appear particularly tempting to non-economists, and even more so if the discussion at hand is concerned with such a monumental task as fighting climate change. But in fact, economics can only answer the first question.
In economics, the first question is answered with the observation of a positive rate of time preference. We do discount our own utility and that of future generations, which is part of our own utility. May be we shouldn't, but that is a different question -an ethical judgement, perhaps one to be answered by philosophers, but surely one outside the realm of economics. The rate of time preference in this case indicates the judgement of the analyst who plugs the weight he gives to future generations into the social welfare function of his model. And a rate of time preference of near-zero indicates judgement so different from actual observation that it can (benevolently) only be explained as a choice dominated by normative desires -what non-scientists might call wishful thinking.
There is also the matter of internal consistency. It is of course possible to ascribe various values, reflecting the modeller's judgement or prejudice to the rate of time preference. But consistency demands that the same weight is given to a person born 20 years from now, as to our future selves. To the extent that we do discount our own future utility at a rate higher than 0.1%, 7 the utility of people born in the future has to be discounted at the same rate as our own, to avoid contradiction.
If this is not rigorously applied, the very "discrimination by birth date" that Stern argues against will ensue, although in reversed order: To discount our own future utility (at a rate higher than zero), but not to discount (apply a time preference rate of zero) the utility of a person born 20 years hence, would mean assigning a higher weight to the utility of those born 20 years from today than to our own utility in 20 years. Surely, logical consistency within the standard economic framework applied in the Review (which itself is never questioned in the Review) requires that all economic agents are to be treated symmetrically: Discounting across generations, in line with what people use in their own lives, is the only way not to generate 'discrimination by birth date'; whereas giving the same weight to all future generations in a social welfare function, while allowing for people to discount their own future, means to discriminate against those who discount their own future.
To be sure, there are many ways to argue against the sense or sensibility of representative agent models or social welfare functions in applied economics -but logical inconsistency is not one of their failings. The Stern Review does not argue that these models are inappropriate for policy conclusions. Acceptance of the basic underlying model in the Review only allows for the conclusion that the value for the rate of pure time preference applied there is motivated by normative desires, not by a desire for objective description.
Does it matter? The second requirement for utilizing the concept of pure time preference in applied economic analysis is clarity about the extent that the outcomea policy recommendation, after all -is dependent on the subjective parameter value applied to the pure rate of time preference. It is here that the Stern Review has been accused of hiding the extent to which its main policy conclusion (that mitigation is superior to adaptation) is dependent merely on the value given to the rate of time preference in its analysis. No matter what "ethical" judgement initially led to the chosen value, it is against this requirement that a sensitivity analysis for values of the rate of pure time preference which are standard in macroeconomic analysis has to be included: It remains essential to judge the validity of the conclusions of the Stern Review by judging the sensitivity of these outcomes against a spectrum of plausible values.
In the meantime, several papers have criticized the Stern Review for the absence of a sensitivity analysis with regard to the value attached to the rate of pure time preference. Byatt et al (2006) criticize the lack of overall sensitivity analysis. In particular, they note that Stern's partial sensitivity analysis, which allows for a rate of pure time preference as high as 1.5%, leads to dramatic decreases in the estimated costs. They also note that the parameter values adopted by the review would imply savings rates which are inconsistent with the ones observed in reality 8 .
Similarly Yohe and Tol (2007) claim: "The use of a very low discount rate is, of course, debatable". They argue that with such low rate of pure time preference 40-50% of estimated costs might come from the events occurring after 2200, the time-frame of the Review (see also Yohe (2006)).
Nordhaus (2007) employs a complex simulation model (DICE-2007) to refute the conclusions of the review. Professor Nordhaus argues that: "The Review's radical revision of the economics of climate change does not arise from any new economics, science, or modelling. Rather, it depends decisively on the assumptions of a near-zero time discount rate combined with a particular view on inequality." His findings though are not directly comparable to the findings of the Review, which employed another complex simulation model (PAGE 2002) .
Weitzman (2008) argues that Stern is right for the wrong reasons. He emphasizes the importance of taking into account the uncertainty about the distribution of extreme weather events: "[T]he catastrophe-insurance aspect of such a fat-tailed unlimitedexposure situation, which can never be fully learned away, can dominate the socialdiscounting aspect, the pure-risk aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect." This logic became known as "Dismal Theorem". Nordhaus (2009) provides a critique of this logic, claiming that conditions for the "Dismal Theorem" are unlikely to be satisfied in a "wide range of potential uncertain scenarios" (see Weitzman (2009) for a response).
The value given to the rate of time preference in the Stern review was not the only parameter value which was criticized. Discount rate and hence estimated costs of global warming are also affected by the assumed elasticity of substitution and expected consumption growth. Dasgupta (2006) suggests performing sensitivity analysis with respect for the elasticity of substitution as well, since otherwise the model would imply a savings rate of 97.5% (de Long criticised this finding by noting that taking into account technological progress is likely to remove this issue.) Gollier (2006) argues against the assumed value of elasticity of substitution, since it implies an implausibly low value of the social discount factor. He shows that "the report requires us to invest in any project whose rate of return would be larger than 1.3." A similar point was made by Kevin Murphy (2007) for the case of a low rate of pure time preference, whereas Stern et al (2007) argue that it is not clear whether higher social rates of return are sustainable into the future, if no measures against climate change are undertaken.
Anthoff, Tol and Yohe (2009) perform a sensitivity analysis of the Stern Review with respect to both, the elasticity of substitution and consumption growth, focusing on the social cost of carbon. They show that the estimates in the Review are as just sensitive to these two parameters as they are to the rate of time preference. This is a short and by no means complete list of the papers, which tried to analyze the sensitivity of the Stern Review with respect to alternative parameter values. The advantage of our paper is that it does not rely on a proprietary computational model as many of the studies above. Instead, we use a simple textbook macroeconomic model to show that indeed the main conclusion of the review seems to be based on one single assumption: an extremely low rate of time preference. In light of Stern's recent "A Blueprint for a Safer Planet" (2009), in which the assertions underlying the Stern Review are repeated, clarifying these issues surrounding remains important for those interested in "the economics of climate change".
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A simple model helps to illustrate our main points. Consider an economy populated by an infinite number of generations of consumers. Each generation in this economy is assumed to live for one period. C t denotes consumption and N t the number of people in particular point in time. Consumption streams over time are ranked according to the following social welfare function:
In this function δ indicates the rate of pure time preference or the social discount factor, (δ>0 and hence e -δ is between 0 and 1). It is this parameter that has been criticised by economists as too low in the Stern Review: A value of zero for δ (and thus e -δ ) implies indifference between (equal utility of) consumption today and consumption tomorrow. The higher δ, the more present consumption is preferred over future consumption. The Stern Review sets δ = 0.1%. We will explore different values further below.
is an instantaneous utility function, describing the utility derived from consumption at a given point in time. Following the Review, we assume that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is one, i.e. σ = 1: U(C) = log(C).
The Stern Review assumes population growth at 0.6% per year, i.e. N t = N 0 exp(0.006t) from 2000 through 2200, from which point onward the population remains constant. No reason is given for this sudden stop in population growth. We suspect it is merely to keep calculations tractable -but it is an important step: Without this assumption, the Review's social welfare function is not defined (see appendix B). However, in the interest of comparable simulations, we keep this same assumption.
Without climate change, people in the global economy would enjoy a consumption stream described by the law of motion e t . The Stern Review assumes that per capita consumption without climate change will grow by 1.3% annually, i.e. it assumes e t = e 0 exp(0.013t).
However, "business as usual" involves an increasing stock of green house gas (GHG) emissions leading to global warming, and global warming will reduce goods available for consumption. Changes in agriculture, migration, catastrophic events etc. will diminish the stream of future consumption by a fraction 1-α t . This fraction will increase over time because the damages from climate change are assumed to increase due to the increased stock of GHG in the atmosphere. Climate change therefore will change the consumption stream to α t e t , where α t decreases, and at best remains constant, over time. The Review assumes that damages from climate change cease in the year 2200. After 2200, consumption grows again at 1.3%, starting from α T e T , without further damages. Using the above assumptions about population and consumption growth, the social welfare function can be written as (Stern, 2007, p. 184 . See appendix A below):
The Review measures the cost of climate change as a fraction of the consumption stream that would have resulted without climate change. This requires computing the decline in consumption associated with climate change, i.e. to find a fixed fraction τ of the original consumption stream which will mirror the utility of the consumption stream with climate change (see figure 1 ). The utility of consumption with damages from climate change is:
The equivalent utility of consumption without climate change, but with a uniform decline in consumption is: The following section provides the results of the numerical analysis.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
The ideal way to investigate the sensitivity of the results of the Review to the underlying assumption about time preference would have been to use the same program. However, the model runs were not available upon request. We therefore developed a separate simulation model. The main difficulty of course is the appropriate choice of damages from climate change represented by the coefficients α t , which diminish the available stream of consumption. All estimates of the costs of global warming will crucially depend on the choice of the path of α t over time -both, the point in time when damages first occur, and the speed with which they are assumed to propagate. Given that the model runs leading to the results in the Stern Review are not made available, these are also potentially the largest results of error in replicating the Review's results.
Luckily, the Review itself undertakes partial sensitivity analysis, if only for low values of δ. 10 We therefore are able to calibrate the time path for damages from climate change to match the data presented in the Review. In addition, we can ensure that the damage estimates in our calculation are less sensitive to changes in the rate of time preference ? than those in the Review over the relevant range (i.e. the costs of climate change in our runs decline less rapidly as ? increases than the costs published in the Stern Review). If anything, the results reported below will understate the magnitude with which the costs of global warming react to changes in the discount rate. Figure 2 illustrates why our estimates are likely to provide a lower bound for the impact of changes in the rate of time preference on the costs of climate change. We simulate three scenarios to capture the path of damages from climate change on consumption.
• In the first scenario, all damages happen in the middle of the period considered in the Review, i.e. in 2100. This depicts a time path for consumption, where consumption before 2100 follows a "business as usual" path, not affected by climate change and then drops permanently to the new, lower path, driven by the one-off cost of climate change:
The consequences of this drop are calibrated so as to match the stipulations of the Review. Assuming a rate of time preference of 0.1%, the cumulative damage comes to 5% of consumption over time, the same as in the Review.
• Scenario 2 is the same as scenario 1 but this time all damages are incurred in the year 2060 instead of 2100. Again, the scenario is calibrated so as to generate 5% of foregone consumption at a rate of time preference of 0.1%, as the cumulative costs of climate change. Both simulations show a considerable "overstatement" of the cost of climate change in the Stern Review, compared to a situation where higher rates of time preference are deemed desirable ( figure 3a and b) . However, these scenarios also depart from the sensitivity analysis performed in the Review (see table 1 ). The costs in these scenarios are less sensitive to the rate of time preference than the Review itself suggests.
Both of our scenarios assume that the losses from climate change occur as a oneoff cost. The Review leaves open the possibility of costs accumulating over time, after they have started to occur. Our third scenario allows for this possibility. Allowing for costs to accumulate over time will increase the sensitivity of cost estimates to changes in the rate of time preference. The rational is easy to see: An accumulation of costs means that a higher proportion of them is shifted into the future. As costs are shifted into the future, changes in the discount rate will have a higher impact.
• In the third scenario, the assumption that the negative impact occurs at a single point in time is replaced by a decline in consumption growth after an initial period during which nothing happens. The Review states that threshold concentrations of 550ppm are likely to be reached between 2035 and 2050 (e.g., Stern 2007 . In line with this statement we assume that the path of consumption growth will start to decline in response to climate change in 2035: D denotes the percentage by which consumption drops below the balanced growth path after the damages from climate change reveal themselves from 2035. Figure 4 shows that the costs on the Stern Review would fall by a factor of more than 17 if the rate of time preference were 4%. The third scenario is closest to the sensitivity results of the Stern Review. Table 1 depicts the sensitivity analysis for the most prominent case, in which the damage from global warming amounts to 5% of consumption expenditures over time and contrasts it with the values generated by the three scenarios discussed above. Clearly, the third one comes closest. It also is in the spirit of providing a low estimate of how the costs from climate change would decline with an increase in the rate of time preference. It therefore appears appropriate to use the methodology of the third scenario to replicate the sensitivity analysis to match all the specifications of damages discussed in the Review. Table 2 below shows the parameter values and the sensitivity analysis considered in the Stern Review. Table 3 below reports the damage estimates resulting from our model. It extends the range of parameter values for the rate of time preference to take account of values of 3% and 4% as encountered in the economic literature (see e.g. Lucas (1988) for the calibration of those values).
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In terms of methodology, we calibrate our model to match the available results for the six specifications introduced in the Review at a value of time preference of 0.1%. We then run it for the parameter values considered in the Review, and extend it for values up to 4%. The results have the "lower bound" feature desirable when the original data is unavailable: For all cases and parameter values covered in the Review, our reported cost estimates are higher and therefore the implied impact of changes in the rate of time preference is lower than in the Review. This tendency is likely to continue also for parameter values larger than 1.5% (not covered in the Review) which gives confidence that our results will underestimate the impact of changes in the rate of time preference on the costs of climate change reported in the Stern Review.
Depending on the preferred rate of time preference, the results indicate that the Stern Review could substantially overstate the potential costs of climate change. If a rate of time preference of 3% were to be considered accurate, the Review would overestimate the costs of climate change by a factor of 8; if a discount of 4% were to be deemed appropriate, it would overestimate costs by a factor of 16 (see tables 3 and 4). Using the parameters in the Review, mitigation costs of 1% of GDP (1.25% of consumption) imply that a factor of 4 would be sufficient to derail the Review's conclusion that mitigation is the preferred option. The cost differentials reported in tables 4 and 5 are high enough to reverse the Review's central conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The policy implications of the Stern Review rest to a large extent on the conclusion that the costs of climate change justify action now, because they are considerably higher than the costs of mitigation. The simulation results above show that this conclusion is indeed based on the assumption of a rate of time preference, which is very low. Cost differentials by a factor of 4 are sufficient to reverse the central policy conclusion of the Review. Calibrating the model at values of 3-4% for the rate of time preference, which are common in applied economics, we show that estimate of the costs of climate change decrease by at least a factor of 8.
The rate of time preference is the single most important factor driving the results of the Stern Report. It is an unobservable parameter, the value of which reflects personal and ethical judgement. The conclusions of the Review are not robust to variations in this parameter. This certainly means that the debate on the ethical foundations of this parameter is of great importance. However, it also raises the question how wise it is to base crucial policy decisions on a methodology so dependent on one single, and deeply subjective, judgement call. (6)) states that the social welfare function can be written as:
LITERATURE
The derivation starts from the following general objective function:
The Review assumes that N(t) = N 0 e nt for t<T, n = 0.6% and N(t) = N(T), t>T. It also assumes that the damages from global warming cease in 2200, with no more damages after 2200, i.e.
C(t) = C T e g(t-T) , t>T.
With these assumptions we get:
(B) Population growth assumptions
The Review (Stern 2007, p. 183, footnote 36) assumes that the global population stops growing after 2200. No rational is provided as to why this may be the case, but it seems to have been motivated by the desire to keep the social welfare function defined for low rates of time preference. For, if the population were to grow forever at a constant rate larger than the rate of time preference (as is the case for population growth of 0.6% and a rate of time preference of 0.1% assumed in the Review), the social welfare function would not exist: The infinite sum can not converge to a finite number, because n> δ (0.6%>0.1%) and because consumption increases over time. In this case, the results would only reflect the authors prior: The damages from climate change could be depicted as arbitrarily high or low, simply by fixing the time horizon T to achieve the desired outcome. We prove this result for the general case. The only assumption needed is that is nonincreasing over time and that there is some t 0 such that α t0 > α t0+1 . Intuitively this means that damages do actually occur and that they are irreversible: As the economy continues to grow, its production potential will always reflect those damages (i.e., output will always be lower than it "would have been" without climate change).
In the general case, the growth equivalent fraction of consumption is defined as:
To be concise, we denote λ = e -δ . This general specification allows for stabilization after 2200, when further damages from climate change cease to exist: i.e. N t , α t are constant after . Calculating lnτ from the expression above gives:
Denote Y t = N t lnα t . Since 0<α t <1 are non-increasing, Y t / N t are negative and nonincreasing as well. The derivative of lnτ with respect to λ is
The sign of this fraction coincides with the sign of its numerator:
If n = m, the corresponding term in the sum above is zero. With n ≠ m, the terms (n,m),(m,n) can be considered together: If n > m, since , this term is non-positive. Similarly, if n < m, and again, the term is non-positive.
Finally, since exists, the corresponding term in the sum is negative.
Thus, the sum is strictly negative. This means that, as the value of the rate of time preference δ increases and λ decreases, lnτ and thus τ increase and the estimated damage 1-τ therefore decreases.
(D) Different discount rates for the cost of global warming and the cost of mitigation The Stern Review estimates that the costs of mitigation would be around 1% of world product in 2050, assuming that world product will grow at 2.5% per year from 2005 onward. 11 At the same time, the Review assumes a growth rate of 1.3% for per capita consumption when computing the costs of global warming. 12 The assumption of constant population growth of 0.6% 13 and a constant (80%) share of consumption in global production 14 imply a global rate of growth of 1.9%. The costs of mitigation are therefore underestimated. We recalculate the costs of mitigation under the assumption that global output grows at 1.9%. Since world product is assumed to grow at 2.5% for 45 years starting from 2005, the costs of mitigation are equal to:
If global output grows at 1.9% instead, it will be equal to just in 2050. The costs of mitigation M will constitute x% of world product where x is defined by the equation:
The corrected mitigation cost estimate thus is 30% higher than the one discussed in the Review.
Moreover, the costs of global warming and the costs of mitigation are measured in different units, i.e. fractions of consumption and world output respectively. If one were to use the corrected estimate of 1.3% of global output, adjusted with the assumption that consumption constitutes 80% of global output, mitigation costs would be 1.3% ---0.8 = 1.64% instead of the 1% argued in the Review. 
